Battle of Pered - Biblioteka.sk

Upozornenie: Prezeranie týchto stránok je určené len pre návštevníkov nad 18 rokov!
Zásady ochrany osobných údajov.
Používaním tohto webu súhlasíte s uchovávaním cookies, ktoré slúžia na poskytovanie služieb, nastavenie reklám a analýzu návštevnosti. OK, súhlasím


Panta Rhei Doprava Zadarmo
...
...


A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | CH | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9

Battle of Pered
 ...
Battle of Pered
Part of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848
Date20–21 June 1849
Location
Result Austro-Russian victory
Belligerents
 Hungarian Revolutionary Army  Austrian Empire
 Russian Empire
Commanders and leaders
 Artúr Görgei
Lajos Asbóth
 Károly Leiningen-Westerburg
 György Klapka
 Ludwig von Wohlgemuth
 Anton Csorich
 Feodor Sergeyevich Panyutyin
Strength
Total: 25,286/23,727 men
- II. corps: 8,059/6,500
- III. corps: 9,395
- VIII. corps: 7,832
113 cannons
Did not participate
I. corps: 7261 men
30 cannons[1]
Total: 39,500 men
- II. corps: 13,500[2]
- IV. (reserve) corps: 14,000
- Panyutyin division: 12,799
172 cannons[1]
Casualties and losses
Total: 2,878 men
- 126 dead
- 180 wounded
- 2,572 missing and captured
7 cannons
Total: 668 men
- 131 dead
- 415 wounded
- 122 missing and captured
260 cannons[1]

The Battle of Pered, fought on 20–21 June 1849, was one of the battles which took place in the Summer Campaign of the Hungarian War of Independence from 1848 to 1849, fought between the Hungarian Revolutionary Army and the Habsburg Empire helped by Russian troops. The Hungarian army was led by General[3] Artúr Görgei, while the imperial army by Lieutenant field marshal Julius Jacob von Haynau. After several preliminary minor battles of the Hungarian and Austrian troops along the Vág river, in which the attacking Hungarians could not achieve success, Görgei took the command of his troops, and after receiving reinforcements, on 20 June, put his troops to attack again towards West. Although the II. Hungarian army corps occupied in heavy fights the village of Pered, the other two corps (the III. and the VIII.) were unsuccessful, and could not advance. The angered Görgei removed the commander of the III. corps, General Károly Knezić because of his inactivity, and Colonel Lajos Asbóth, the commander of the II. corps who, in contrast to Knezić, was the only commander who accomplished his duties. While Knezić's place was taken by Colonel Károly Leiningen-Westerburg, who was a great choice, Asbóth's place was taken by Colonel József Kászonyi, who was an explicitly bad choice. Haynau, who on the first day of the battle was moving the bulk of his troops to cross the Danube to start an attack on its southern bank, sent three of his corps, which were still on the northern bank, to repel the Hungarian forces. The two Austrian (II., IV.) and one Russian (Fedor Panyutin's) corps started their attack on 21 June and forced the Hungarians to retreat from Pered and Zsigárd, which forced Görgei to order his troops to retreat from the battlefield.

Background

Thanks to the victories of the Spring Campaign, the Hungarian Revolutionary Army liberated much of Hungary from the occupation of the numerically and technologically superior Habsburg armies and their Serbian, Romanian, and Croatian allies.[4] The Hungarian army of Transylvania, led by Lieutenant General Józef Bem even managed to chase out from the province the first Russian intervention troops (7000 soldiers), which entered there in the winter of 1849.[5] From the end of March the Austrian politicians and military leaders understood that the Habsburg Empire is incapable of crushing their revolution by relying on their strength.[6] So, based on the Münchengrätz Agreements from 1833, according to which the Habsburg and Russian Empires and Prussia agreed to help each other if their sovereignty is threatened by a revolt or revolution, Austria decided to ask for Russian help against the Hungarian Revolution, although initially, they were reluctant to do that, because they were conscious that this will cause them a big loss of prestige.[6] But the Hungarian victories of the Spring Campaign made the Habsburg government make this unwanted step, and on 21 April, they made the official help request from Russia, followed by the letter of the emperor Franz Joseph I of Austria to Tsar Nicholas I of Russia.[6] In result the Tsar decided to send 200,000 Russian soldiers to Hungary, putting another 80,000 in reserve, to enter Hungary if their presence would be needed.[7] Although the Hungarian Government led by Bertalan Szemere and Governor President Lajos Kossuth believed that the European nations would not allow Russia to intervene in Hungary, the European states and England agreed with Russian intervention to crush the Hungarian revolution, thus Lord Palmerston replied to the question of the Russian ambassador about the reaction of England to Russian intervention in Hungary, saying: Finish them quickly!, demanding that after they fulfilled their task to return in Russia immediately.[8] Although England worried about Russian intervention in Hungary, its first concern was that the Russian Empire to not advance in the Balkans, and an important condition for this was a strong Habsburg Empire.[8] So, an independent Hungary could have impeded England's world domination policy.

In the meanwhile, after the capture of Buda General György Klapka, as the deputy minister of war, elaborated the plan for the Hungarian military actions for summer, called later the Summer Campaign. His plan was based on the inactivity of the main Hungarian army corps, stationed around the fortress of Komárom, in the case of a retreat, appointed as the concentration point of the Hungarian troops in the Hungarian capitals (Buda and Pest) and Miskolc, which were facing the main imperial forces under the command of Lieutenant Field Marshal Julius Jacob von Haynau, while the Hungarian troops from Transylvania and Southern Hungary had to accomplish so heavy tasks that could be achieved only after relentless military actions in two months. In the plan made by Klapka, the Russian military intervention was only faintly mentioned without taking any measure against it.[8] This plan was rejected by many of the Hungarian commanders (Józef Bem, Lieutenant General Henryk Dembiński), who said that they would not obey it.[8] The Hungarian commander-in-chief and War Minister General Artúr Görgei also protested against this plan, underlining that as the concentration point of the Hungarian troops instead of Miskolc, Komárom should be appointed, and because of the imminent threat of the Russian intervention, he saw that the only way still open to the Hungarian army was to deal a decisive blow to the main imperial army before the slowly moving Russian forces arrived. This would have forced Austria to enter talks, and offer some kind of settlement, with the Hungarians.[9]

Görgei planned to attack towards Pozsony and Vienna quickly before the main Russian army started its attack on the Eastern and Northern fronts against Hungary. To this end he and his chief of the general staff, Lieutenant-Colonel József Bayer, created at end of May the Central Operational Bureau (Központi Hadműveleti Iroda), to coordinate the movements of the different units of the Hungarian main army corps gathered in the Western Front.[10] Besides the troops which the Central Operational Bureau disposed of (I., II., III. and parts of the VIII. corps), on the Western Front was another army grouping to which the VII. corps from the Rába line, led by Ernő Poeltenberg (from 6 May Colonel, and from 7 June General),[11] and the garrison of Komárom (the VIII. corps) belonged, and this was led by Major General György Klapka, commander of the garrison of Komárom. Klapka refused to submit to the orders of the chief of the general staff József Bayer, actioning independently.[12]

Görgey Artúr litográfia Barabás
Ludwig von Wohlgemuth

Görgei planned to attack as quickly as possible the Austrian troops on the Western Border of Hungary with the I., II., III., and parts of the VIII. corps, which were under the Central Operational Bureau's command, on the left Bank of the Danube, while the remainder of his troops had to protect the defensive line based on the Rába and Marcal rivers. Before the attack, he hoped that the 12,000 soldiers led by Józef Bem, coming from the southern front and Transylvania, promised by Kossuth to arrive to join his forces (unfortunately Bem refused to come, saying that this will leave Transylvania defenseless against the imminent Russian invasion).[13] The Hungarian armies at the beginning of the Summer Campaign consisted of 150,000 soldiers, 464 field, and 393 defensive (castle) cannons.[14]

Another problem of the Hungarian army was that many of the talented, experienced Hungarian generals, who helped decisively the success of the Spring Campaign, were no more available (János Damjanich, who broke his leg; Lajos Aulich who became ill;[15] András Gáspár) who resigned from the Hungarian army because of political reasons[16]) and General Görgei was forced to put in their place other officers who were talented soldiers, but were not experienced as army corps leaders, many of them lacking capacity of acting independently when it needed and they had no order to do so, but the military situation required this.[17] So, Görgei put General Károly Knezić in Damjanich's place to lead III. corps, Colonel Lajos Asbóth in Aulich's place to lead II. corps, General Ernő Poeltenberg in Gáspár's place.[17] General György Klapka who formerly was the commander of the I. corps, but who became temporary main commander of the main Hungarian army, called Hungarian Army of the Upper Danube (Feldunai Hadsereg),[18] taking the place of Görgei, who became War Minister, had to give his position at the head of his corps to General József Nagysándor.[17] These new corps commanders lacked the former generals' talent, intuition and experience.[17] Görgei himself, because of now being War Minister, had to fulfill these two heavy tasks (ministry and high commandment of the army), could not focus in the same way on the military actions as he did in the Spring Campaign.[17]

At the start of the Summer Campaign, the Hungarian army had the same problem as the imperial main armies had at the beginning of the Spring Campaign: its commanders had not much knowledge about the enemy's distribution and where their main forces were stationed. The Hungarian intelligence failed to accomplish this important task.[17] The support from the southern front (around 12 000 men) did not arrive, despite Görgei's hopes, because with the arrival there of Feldzeugmeister Josip Jelačić's troops, in support to the Serbian rebels and Austrian troops stationed there, the military situation changed there in the favor of the imperials, so all the Hungarian troops were needed there.[17]

On the other hand, the Austro-Russian coalition prepared to attack Hungary with 358,000 soldiers and 1354 cannons (165,000 Austrians with 770 cannons and 193,000 Russians with 584 cannons).[14] While Russian and Austrian army groups, led by General Alexander von Lüders and General Eduard Clam-Gallas, prepared their attacks Transylvania from Bucovina, Wallachia and Moldavia, (53,000 soldiers and 133 cannons against 39,000 Hungarians, who were mainly fresh recruits without any war experience, and 107 cannons), the main Russian army under the leadership of Field Marshal Ivan Paskevich had to advance from the North (135,000 Russian soldiers and 448 cannons against 16,500 Hungarians with 49 cannons), the Austro-Croatian-Serbian troops led by Feldzeugmeister Josip Jelačić operated in Southern Hungary (53,000 soldiers with 401 cannons against 34,000 Hungarians and 249 cannons).[14] The numerical disadvantage of the Hungarian armies was augmented also that 13% of the Hungarian troops in Transylvania and Eastern Hungary were used in the sieges of different fortifications in imperial hands (Arad, Temesvár, Gyulafehérvár, Titel) (around 12,000 men), while others (8000 men) were garrisons in different fortifications, so they could not be used as moving forces against the invading Austro-Russian armies.[19]

From the West, the imperial troops which were preparing to attack Hungary were led by Lieutenant Field Marshal Haynau, the commander-in-chief of all the Habsburg forces outside Italy, were about 83,000 soldiers (71,000 Austrians and a 12,000-strong Russian army corps led by Lieutenant General Feodor Sergeyevich Panyutyin) and 336 cannons, against nearly 51,000 Hungarian soldiers (except a part of the garrison of the fortress of Komárom, the VIII. corps, which could not be moved out from the fortress to fight in open field) with 196 field and 244 defensive cannons used only in the fortifications, led by General Görgei.[14] This assured Haynau a huge superiority.

The military situation on the Western Front before and after the Battle of Pered.
Red: Austrians.
Broken red line: Russians.
Black: Hungarians

Görgei's troops were positioned along the river Vág downwards to Komárom, and south of the Danube along the Rába's Eastern bank until Marcaltő.[17] The mining towns (Bakabánya, Besztercebánya, Bélabánya, Körmöcbánya, Libetbánya, Selmecbánya, Újbánya) were protected by a detachment of 2700 soldiers led by Ármin Görgei, to South to this, around Mocsonok, Ürmény and Komjáti were 1300 soldiers at Nyitra, to south the I. corps led by General József Nagysándor consisting of 7400 men, from here until Érsekújvár on the course of the Vág the 9200 soldiers of the III. corps led by General Károly Knezić were positioned, south of this until Komárom stationed the 8600 men of the II. corps led by Colonel Lajos Asbóth, in Csallóköz stood the 4000 men strong division of the VIII. corps which were defending Komárom under General György Klapka (later another 3400 soldiers left the fortress to support the field army's operations). These 4000 soldiers from Csallóköz assured contact between the troops to North and South from the Danube. South to the Danube, around Győr was the 9000 soldiers of the VII. corps under General Ernő Poeltenberg, and finally the Hungarian line's southernmost unit was the Kmety division consisting of 5100 men.[20] The concentration, in the opportunity of a battle of these troops was impossible, because of the great length of the front, consisting in total 250 kilometers.[21]

The Austrian troops which faced the Hungarians in the Western, under the high command of Lieutenant Field Marshal Julius Jacob von Haynau were positioned as follows. On the right (Southern) bank of the Danube: the III. corps under the lead of Lieutenant General von Moltke was stationed around Sopron having 16,200 men,[2] the I. corps, under the command of General Franz Schlik, consisting of 21,900 soldiers[2] were around Moson, Magyaróvár, Öttevény, Kimle and Hédervár; on the left bank: the bulk of the 13,500 men big II. corps under Lieutenant General Anton Csorich was in Csallóköz, and its Pott-brigade stationed along the Vág river at Farkasd and Vágsellye, the reserve (IV.) corps under the lead of Lieutenant General Ludwig von Wohlgemuth consisted of 17,700 soldiers,[2] and had its headquarters at Nagyszombat, while its brigades were stationed at Szered, Vága and Galgóc. To these troops was sent in support by the high commander of the Russian forces, Marshall Ivan Paskevich the Russian division, consisting of 11,900 soldiers under the lead of Lieutenant General Feodor Sergeyevich Panyutyin, which was stationed first around Pozsony, then, because the Cholera epidemic, which broke out in that region, it was moved to Modor and Bazin.[21]

Görgei planned to start a Hungarian attack on the northern banks of the Danube against the troops of Haynau. But on 13 June, the 15th Hungarian division commanded by Colonel György Kmety attacked on the southern Bank of the Danube, and defeated an Austrian half brigade led by Major General Franz Wyss in the Battle of Csorna.[22] This attack had to attract some of the imperial troops towards the south, to make the task of the main Hungarian attack along the Vág river easier.[23] Haynau indeed sent the order to his troops to move southwards and cross the Danube, but this was not given because Kmety's victory impressed him, but because the imperial commander wanted to start the general offensive there towards Komárom.[23]

Prelude

Map of the region in which the Battles of Zsigárd and Pered took place

On 16 June, Colonel Lajos Asbóth, the commander of the II. corps, with around 8000 soldiers, started an attack towards Pered, but, despite initial successes, in the Battle of Zsigárd suffered a defeat, mainly because of the III. corps led by Major General Károly Knezić, which did not come to his rescue.[24] The attack of the I. corps led by Major General József Nagysándor against the Austrian entrenched encampment from Sempte, but he too suffered a defeat.[24] At the same time a Hungarian division advanced to Csilizpatas, but they stopped there.[24] The only success of those actions was the building, by one of the II. corps detachments, of a bridge across the Vág river. This bridge served in the ensuing battle of Pered, an important role for the movement of their troops.[25] Hearing about these defeats, Görgei decided to repeat the attack on Pered, but with more troops.[24] Görgei had the following troops to attack the imperial army at his disposition: the I., II., III. corps and a part of the VIII. corps, which were a totally of 32,907, or according to other sources 31,348 soldiers, with 143 batteries.[1] In the meanwhile on 19 June, Haynau ordered his troops to cross the Danube for the general attack on the southern bank of the Danube against Győr, but to hide his plans, ordered his troops which were still on the northern banks, to repulse the Hungarian attack on the Vág's valley.[26] So he ordered the II. corps together with the reserve (IV.) corps to occupy the banks of Vág, making a bridgehead at Sempte. On 18 June Wohlgemuth installed his headquarters at Galánta.[27] At the same time, he sent the Panyutyin division, from Szenc to Diószeg to support the reserve corps.[26] Wohlgemuth planned an attack with the Pott and Theissing brigades against the Hungarian forces from the region of the lower Vág, but first, he wanted to know the strength of the Hungarians in that region.[27] So, on 18 June the Pott and the Theissing brigades of the II. corps received the order to do a reconnaissance-in-force towards Alsószeli,[26] and after carrying out this, they reported 18,000-20,000 Hungarian soldiers in the region, which made Wohlgemuth postpone the planned attack until more Austrian troops arrive.[27] On 20 Wohlgemuth planned with these two brigades to advance towards Negyed and Királyrév, to learn more precise pieces of information about the enemy when the Hungarian attack started.[26] At the military council held on 19 June in Zsigárd with Herzinger and Pott, Lieutenant General Wohlgemuth decided that in the case of a Hungarian attack from the south, Pott would not defend the village for long, but would retreat to Pered, where he would join forces with Herzinger to stop the Hungarian Hungarian troops. To this end, Pott's brigade was temporarily reinforced with the 5th cuirassier regiment and with the 2nd cavalry artillery battery.[28]

Although Haynau started the transfer of his troops on the right bank of the Danube, on 20–21 June, he still had superior forces against the attacking Hungarians.[29] Lieutenant General Ludwig von Wohlgemuth was named the commandment of the Austro-Russian forces which faced Görgei's troops.[26] On 19 April that year Wohlgemuth suffered a severe defeat from the Hungarians in the Battle of Nagysalló, so on 21 June, he could repair his former mistake.

In the days before the battle, the II. corps stationed at Aszód, the III. corps at Tardoskedd and Mocsonok, while the Rakovszky detachment was at Farkasd.[27] Görgei entrusted the leader of the II. corps Colonel Lajos Asbóth, to be the spearhead of the attack, giving him a chance to repair his mistakes made in the battle of Zsigárd. Asbóth discussed the time when he planned the attack with Lieutenant Colonel Samu Rakovszky, and concentrated his troops on 19 June evening at Aszódpuszta, and at 11 o'clock, they started the crossing of Danube's Érsekújvár branch.[28] Around 2:00 a.m., when the II. corps was still crossing, Görgei arrived at Aszódpuszta.[28] His initial intention was to participate in the upcoming battle, but György Klapka, who was against the Hungarian attack from the next day,[27] asked him to go to the bridge Aszódpuszta, to discuss if the VIII. has to start an attack in Csallóköz at the same time as the attack of the II. and III. corps in the Vág valley,[30] so Görgei left, promising to return to the battlefield as soon as he finished the discussions. Because of this Colonel Asbóth had to start this battle alone, as he did in the battle of Zsigárd.[28]

Opposing forces

20 June

The Hungarian army

Commander in chief: General Artúr Görgei;
Chief of staff: Colonel József Bayer;

- II. corps:
Commander: Colonel Lajos Asbóth, from 21 June Colonel József Kászonyi;

  • Mándy division: 3 ½ Honvéd battalions, 1 line infantry battalion, 1 jäger company, 1 volunteer company, 2 sapper companies, 6 companies of the 6. (Württemberg) Hussar regiment, 7 three-pounder infantry cannons, 8 six-pounder infantry cannons, 8 twelve-pounder infantry cannons;
  • Szekulits division: 5 Honvéd battalions, 2 companies of the 17. (Bocskai) Hussar regiment, 1 company of the Cuman volunteer cavalry, 7 three-pounder infantry cannons, 16 six-pounder infantry cannons;

Total: 10 infantry battalions, 9 cavalry companies, 51 cannons, 8,547 soldiers.[31]

- III. corps:
Commander: General Károly Knezić, from 21 June Colonel Károly Leiningen-Westerburg;

  • Czillich division: 3 line infantry battalions, 2 Honvéd battalions, 2 sapper companies, 16 six-puonder cannons;
  • Podoski division: 2 line infantry battalions, 2 Honvéd battalions, 6 six-puonder cannons, 4 Congreve rocket launching racks;
  • Pikéty division: 2. hussar regiment, 4 companies of the 3. hussar regiment, 14 cannons;

Total: 9 1/3 infantry battalions, 12 cavalry companies, 40 cannons, 9,395 soldiers.

- VIII. corps:
Commander: General György Klapka;

  • Kosztolányi division: 1 line infantry battalion, 3 Honvéd battalions, ½ sapper company, 12 hussar companies, 9 three-pounder, 8 six-pounder and 8 cavalry cannons;[32]

Total: 4 ½ infantry battalions, 12 cavalry companies, 25 cannons, 7,832 soldiers.[1]

Army total: 152 ½ infantry companies, 32 cavalry companies, 4118 horses for riding, 1763 horses for traction, 113 cannons,[1] 25,774 soldiers

Did not participate: I. corps, 56 infantry companies, 12 cavalry companies, 1400 horses for riding, 670 horses for traction, 30 cannons, 7,261 soldiers[1]

Detailed order of battle of the II. Hungarian corps

Commander: Colonel Lajos Asbóth
Chief of staff: Lieutenant Colonel Ferenc Messzéna
Corps adjutant: Major Sándor Mednyánszky
Commander of the artillery: Major Tomas Phillipowszky
Commander of the sappers: Captain Balázs Dullesko
Chief of the medical staff: Dr. Károly Inándy[33]

Corps Division Brigade Unit Infantry company Cavalry company Horse Cannon Number

II. Corps
   Colonel Lajos Asbóth

4. (Mándy) division

1. (Szabó) brigade

  • 48. Honvéd battalion
6 - 6 - 645
  • Bocskai (2.52) Honvéd battalion
3 - 6 - 461
1 - 1 - 136
1 - - - 108
  • 3. sapper battalion
2 - 1 - 229
  • Colonel division (?) of the 6. (Württemberg) Hussar regiment
- 2 243 - 226
  • 1. three-pounder infantry battery
- - 95 7 142
  • 2. cavalry battery
- - 93 5 108

Total

13 2 443 12 2055

2. (Collig) brigade

  • 25. Honvéd battalion
6 - 5 - 595
  • 1. battalion of the 39. (Dom Miguel) infantry regiment
6 - 3 - 404
  • 54. Honvéd battalion
6 - 2 - 683
  • Lieutenant colonel and 2. Major division (?) of the 6. (Württemberg) Hussar regiment
- 4 487 - 454
  • 1. six-pounder infantry battery
- - 118 8 164
  • 2. twelve-pounder battery
- - 72 8 92

Total

18 4 689 16 2392

5. (Szekulits) division

1. (Csúzy) brigade

  • 61. Honvéd battalion
6 - 24 - 722
  • 63. Honvéd battalion
6 - 17 - 536
  • 49. Honvéd battalion
4 - 19 - 526
  • 2. three-pounder infantry battery
- - 94 7 139
  • 6. six-pounder infantry battery
- - 116 8 144

Total

10 - 270 15 2067

2. (Kisfaludy) brigade

  • 56. Honvéd battalion
6 - 31 - 793
  • 60. Honvéd battalion
6 - 13 - 761
  • 1. Major division of the 17. (Bocskai) Hussar regiment
- 2 245 - 240
  • Cuman volunteer cavalry company
- 1 80 - 80
  • 5. six-pounder infantry battery
- - 114 8 159

Total

12 3 483 8 2033
Corps total 53 9 1855 51 8547[31]

The Austrian army

Commander in chief: Field Marshal Julius Jacob von Haynau;
Chief of staff: Lieutenant Colonel Wilhelm von Ramming;

- II. corps:
Commander: Lieutenant General Anton Csorich;
Chief of staff: Lieutenant Colonel Franz Jungbauer;
Colloredo division;

  • Pott brigade: 3. & 4. battalions of the Haynau infantry regiment, 3. battalion of the Koudelka infantry regiment, 3. battalion of the Fürstenwärther infantry regiment, 11. six-pounder infantry battery (4 infantry battalions, 6 cannons);
  • Liebler brigade: 1., 2., 3. & 1. Landwehr battalions of the Archduke Stephen infantry regiment, 1. battalion of the Wimpfen infantry regiment, 4 companies of the Civalart uhlan cavalry regiment, 8. six-pounder infantry battery (5 infantry battalions, 4 cavalry companies, 6 cannons);
  • Barco brigade: 1., 2., & 3. battalions of the Mazzuchelli infantry regiment, 3. battalion of the Baumgarten infantry regiment, 1. Landwehr battalion of the Baumgarten infantry regiment, 4. border guard regiment of Otočac, 2 companies of the Civalart uhlan cavalry regiment, 13. six-pounder infantry battery (6 infantry battalions, 2 cavalry companies, 6 cannons);
  • Artillery reserve: 2 twelve-pounder batteries, 1 six-pounder battery, 1 cavalry battery (24 cannons);

Total: 15 infantry battalions, 6 cavalry companies, 42 cannons, 2 military bridge equipment,[34] 13,505 soldiers.[2]

- IV. (reserve) corps:
Commander: Lieutenant General Ludwig von Wohlgemuth;
Chief of staff: Major Joseph Freiherr von Weber;
1. (Herzinger) division;

  • Theissing brigade: Schneider, Fischer, Richter & Bittermann grenadier battalions, 18. six-pounder infantry battery (4 infantry battalions, 6 cannons);
  • Perin brigade: Rattay, Koudelka, Pásztory & Trenk grenadier battalions, 16. six-pounder infantry battery (4 infantry battalions, 6 cannons);

2. (Burits) division;

  • Jablonowski brigade: 1., 2., 3. & Landwehr battalions of the Nassau infantry regiment, 7. six-pounder infantry battery (5 infantry battalions, 4 cavalry companies, 6 cannons);
  • Lederer brigade: 2 companies of the Emperor Franz Joseph cuirassier regiment, 2 companies of the Sunstenau cuirassier regiment, 6 companies of the Emperor Ferdinand cuirassier regiment, 6 companies of the Auersperg cuirassier regiment, 2. cavalry battery (16 cavalry companies, 6 cannons);
  • Artillery reserve: 2 twelve-pounder batteries, 1 six-pounder battery, 1 Congreve rocket battery (24 cannons);

Total: 17 infantry battalions, 24 cavalry companies, 60 cannons, 2 military equipment,[34] 14,000 soldiers.[2]

- 9. combined Russian infantry division:
Commander: Lieutenant General Fedor Sergeyevich Panyutin;
Chief of staff: Major Kabiuv;

  • Kobyakov infantry brigade: 15. jäger regiment of count Dibitch Zabalkanski, 18. jäger regiment of count Paskevich Erivanski (8 infantry battalions);
  • 9. Semyakin artillery brigade: 2 companies of Civalart uhlans, 1 heavy artillery, 1 light artillery (2 cavalry companies, 48 cannons);

Total: 16 infantry battalions, 2 cavalry companies, 48 cannons.[34] 12,799 soldiers.[1]

Army total: 219 infantry companies, 32 cavalry companies, 172 cannons,[1] 40,304 soldiers

Detailed order of battle of the Pott and Theissing brigades

Commander Major General Anton Freiherr von Herzinger

Brigade Unit Infantry company Cavalry company Horse Cannon Congreve rocket Number

Pott brigade

6 - - - - c.586
  • 1. battalion of the 10. (Mazzuchelli) line infantry regiment
5 - - - - c.692
  • 3. battalion of the 40. (Koudelka) line infantry regiment
5 - - - - c.681
  • 3. battalion of the 56. (Fürstenwärther) line infantry regiment
6 - - - - c.717
  • 3. battalion of the 57. (Haynau) line infantry regiment
3 - - - - Zdroj:https://en.wikipedia.org?pojem=Battle_of_Pered
Text je dostupný za podmienok Creative Commons Attribution/Share-Alike License 3.0 Unported; prípadne za ďalších podmienok. Podrobnejšie informácie nájdete na stránke Podmienky použitia.






Text je dostupný za podmienok Creative Commons Attribution/Share-Alike License 3.0 Unported; prípadne za ďalších podmienok.
Podrobnejšie informácie nájdete na stránke Podmienky použitia.

Your browser doesn’t support the object tag.

www.astronomia.sk | www.biologia.sk | www.botanika.sk | www.dejiny.sk | www.economy.sk | www.elektrotechnika.sk | www.estetika.sk | www.farmakologia.sk | www.filozofia.sk | Fyzika | www.futurologia.sk | www.genetika.sk | www.chemia.sk | www.lingvistika.sk | www.politologia.sk | www.psychologia.sk | www.sexuologia.sk | www.sociologia.sk | www.veda.sk I www.zoologia.sk