A faultless disagreement is a disagreement when Party A states that P is true, while Party B states that non-P is true, and neither party is at fault. Disagreements of this kind may arise in areas of evaluative discourse, such as aesthetics, justification of beliefs or moral values, etc. A representative example is that John says Paris is more interesting than Rome, while Bob claims Rome is more interesting than Paris. Furthermore, in the case of a faultless disagreement, it is possible that if any party gives up their claim, there will be no improvement in the position of any of them.^{[1][clarification needed]}

Within the framework of formal logic it is impossible that both P and not-P are true, and it was attempted to justify faultless disagreements within the framework of relativism of the Truth (propositional truth being relative to perspectives),^[2] Max Kölbel and Sven Rosenkranz present arguments to the point that genuine faultless disagreements are impossible.^[1][2] However, defenses of faultless disagreement, and of alethic relativism more generally, continue to be made by critics of formal logic as it is currently constructed.^[3]

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